Turkey: Missing Bill Clinton by Kibaroglu, M.
URKS HAVE TRADITIONALLY PREFERRED A REPUBLI-
can president in the United States, at least since
the establishment of strategic relationships in the
immediate aftermath of World War II. Democ-
ratic presidents have been received with less en-
thusiasm and a degree of suspicion. But now it seems the
tide is turning with Republican George W. Bush in the
White House. Most Turks are yearning for the days of
Democrat Bill Clinton. 
Unpleasant feelings toward Democrats stem in part
from a letter sent to Ankara by President Lyndon John-
son in 1964. In December 1963, Turkey was concerned
that Greek Cypriots would kill Turkish Cypriots with a
view to cleansing Cyprus of Turks and annexing the is-
land to Greece. Then–Turkish Prime Minister Ismet
Inonu ordered a limited air raid over the island to deter
the Greeks. But Johnson wrote that if Turkey used
American-origin military equipment in Cyprus, and if, as
a result, the Soviets were to interfere or attack Turkey,
NATO would not put its policy of collective defense in
operation. Another Democrat in the White House, Jimmy
Carter, brought about even greater ill feeling when he ap-
plied an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975 after Turkey
intervened in Cyprus to prevent the possible annexation
of the island by Greece. These two events, both having
occurred when Democrats were in office, are deeply
etched in the minds of many Turks. 
Republican presidents, on the other hand, usually
placed a much higher value on hard security issues in the
context of the Cold War, during which Turkey played an
indispensable role as a staunch U.S. ally. Moreover, they
usually turned a blind eye to the highly influential role
the Turkish military played in domestic politics, a matter
that was harshly criticized by other Western countries. 
When looked at through the prism of security,
Turkey’s “estate value” bordering Soviet territory was
first among all considerations. Especially during the Rea-
gan administration, which found itself challenged by the
Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Turkey was seen as the last fortress of West-
ern values on the Eastern front. 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, followed soon after
by the demise of the Soviet Union, did not diminish
Turkey’s value, as many had presumed it might. The first
George Bush, another Republican, was in the White
House, and the new battleground, Iraq, was in Turkey’s
immediate neighborhood. Under the leadership of Presi-
dent Turgut Ozal, Turkey voluntarily sided with the
United States to overturn Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. The Turkish and American lead-
ers spoke frequently over the phone to exchange views on
the conduct of the Iraqi campaign and its aftermath. 
DEMOCRAT BILL CLINTON WAS AT FIRST VIEWED WITH A DE-
gree of suspicion. It was a time when democratic values
were rapidly spreading through territories that had been
ruled by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Human
rights and democratization were the key words that ac-
curately depicted the post–Cold War era. Yet it was at
this time that Turkey intensified its fight against the PKK-
led Kurdish separatists who used northern Iraq as a sanc-
tuary to launch frequent attacks on Turkey. Not surpris-
ingly, the military campaign against the PKK had
negative implications for Turkey—the United States re-
duced both military and financial aid. But against all
odds, Bill Clinton’s official visit to Turkey in November
1999, a few months after a devastating earthquake in the
northwestern part of the country, and his address to Par-
liament, created positive feelings toward a Democrat for
the first time since John F. Kennedy.
In the run-up to the last U.S. presidential election, the
preference of the Turkish public was unclear. Some ar-
gued that a Republican president would take good care
of Turkey’s needs, as usual, especially in the security
realm. Others claimed that a Democrat would further ad-
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vance bilateral relations as had Clinton. A Democratic
administration, some believed, would show more respect
for international law, assign more roles to international
organizations, and pursue multilateralism in its foreign
relations in the new millennium. Some also argued  that
Turkey’s democracy had strengthened as it drew closer to
the European Union as a designated candidate for EU
membership. There was, therefore, no reason to worry
about criticism from Congress about a “poor human
rights record.” In such an international context, Turkey
would be secure and it could improve its economic situa-
tion by reducing military spending, which was usually
urged by Republican administrations in Washington.    
BUT THE SO-CALLED NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY, WHICH
favors unilateralism in international affairs, has created
unexpected difficulties in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
In contrast to the warm climate that existed during the
first Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq has resulted in an un-
precedented trauma in strategic relations. After Parliament
rejected the basing of tens of thousands of U.S. troops on
Turkish soil [see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey Says No,”
July/August 2003 Bulletin], Bush issued harsh warnings to
Turkey not to meddle in Iraqi territory. Bush appeared to
favor the Kurds in northern Iraq over Turkey in forming
an alliance against Saddam. That the Kurds have attained
such a high profile in the politics of Iraq has caused much
resentment among the Turks. And when some Turkish
special forces in the northern Iraqi city of Suleymaniyah
were arrested by American troops on July 4, 2003, it
deepened the degree of resentment. Bush is considered di-
rectly responsible for these developments. 
Surveys indicate that most Turks believe Clinton would
have behaved differently toward Turkey, even though the
Clinton administration had done much for the Kurds
during his term. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
made remarkable efforts to mend the differences between
two Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani and Masout Barzani,
to achieve a unified authority in Iraq’s northern region
which for more than a decade was protected from Sad-
dam’s forces by a U.S.-enforced no-fly zone. Kurdish rule
of the region, including the establishment of a parliament
and a central bank, was highly visible. Yet, these devel-
opments did not make headlines very often, nor did they
seriously affect Turkish feelings about the United States
or its president. It is difficult to claim the same thing
today. 
ANTI-AMERICANISM, WHICH IS GAINING GROUND QUICKLY
and profoundly in most parts of the globe—and more so
in the Islamic world—is also becoming an issue in Turkey.
But the threshold is not passed yet, and the pace is not as
fast. There are still chances to reverse the mood that is
nevertheless growing in the Turkish public domain.
By acknowledging Turkey’s serious concerns over
Iraq’s territorial as well as political integrity, and its de-
sire to play a role in the future restructuring of that
country, the United States may yet dis-
play an appreciation of the value of
Turkish-American relations. There are
recent examples of how popular feeling
toward the United States can be positive-
ly affected. For instance, Bush’s decision
to offer Turkey an $8.5 billion long-term
credit to cover some of its losses due to
the war in Iraq was seen as a step in the
right direction.
Similarly, Turks showed their readiness
to forget about the past by agreeing in
early October to send troops into the zone
of conflict when the Bush administration
asked for help. 
However, in the end, the issue of send-
ing troops only exacerbated the tension of
already strained relations. The day after
Parliament approved the resolution to
send Turkish military units to help keep order and main-
tain security (a plan drawn up at the request of American
officials but much opposed by the public), the U.S. ad-
ministration bluntly told Turkey to forget it. Although
the Iraqi Governing Council, which was appointed by the
United States, seemed to be the authority rejecting the de-
ployment of Turkish troops, almost everybody in Turkey
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HE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY’S
assassination garnered much attention world-
wide. In Germany, Kennedy’s famous declara-
tion, “Ich bin ein Berliner” (“I am a Berliner”),
expressing his solidarity with the half-city en-
closed by the newly erected Berlin wall, is not forgotten.
Its public repetition is a regular and welcome exercise.
Most Germans are aware that our democracy, our con-
stitution that respects human rights, and our integration
into the international community after World War II were
achieved with the help of other Western nations, foremost
among them the United States. Because of this, trans-
atlantic ties have been considered precious despite vari-
ous disagreements over international policy issues, such
as the German-Soviet gas trade that went against U.S.
will, or certain aspects of Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik”—
reconciliation and détente with the East—at the end of
the 1970s. These temporary differences of opinion were
considered par for the course and not disruptive. In the
past, being pro-American has been synonymous with
being in favor of international collaboration and partici-
pation in international organizations and treaties. 
But now it seems that being pro-multilateral and pro-
transatlantic may be contradictory. The Bush administra-
tion appears to fundamentally deviate from multilateral-
ism and to disrespect international treaty regimes and
laws. It has terminated the consensus among democracies
that had been uncontested since World War II. 
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believed it was the opposition of the Kurds that led to the
rejection. 
Moreover, Bush’s unilateralism in foreign policy has
other negative implications for Turkey’s security. A num-
ber of arms control and disarmament treaties as well as
the nonproliferation regimes, which are sincerely ob-
served and considered to be mainstays of Turkish for-
eign policy, are being seriously undermined as a result of
the unprecedented negligence of the U.S. president.
As for Bush’s National Security Strategy, and the close-
ly associated preemptive-strike doctrine, in its first test in
Iraq, “irrelevance” could be the word to define the rela-
tionship between theory and praxis. 
The concept of preemptive strike, no matter how con-
troversial it may be, may still have some limited relevance
in the fight against global terrorism. The groups that
have launched “holy war” against the United States and
its allies are spread around the world. They cannot be de-
terred by threat of death, nor can they be paid off to
make concessions from their doctrinaire beliefs. The de-
gree of devastation caused by attacks by such groups, as
witnessed in New York and Washington, D.C., as well as
in Bali, in Riyadh, and more recently, in Istanbul, can be
enormous. 
The threat of retaliation, in those cases when it may be
possible, cannot deter such groups. Preemption, with a
view to preventing or minimizing devastation, may be an
option in such circumstances. But it should be applicable
only to non-state actors who have no specific address,
not to states. Presumably, states are governed by rational
actors, who can agree upon negotiated solutions and
make concessions, or can be deterred from launching an
attack by the threat of retaliation in kind. In the case of
Iraq, the country was neither a non-state actor nor did it
have proven links with non-state actors. Thus, the first
test of the doctrine of preemption failed. 
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